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Human Contingency, Divine Freedom, 
and the Normative Shape of Saving History 
Philip J Rossi 
I. Introduction: Contingency, Doubly Inflected 
The claims and arguments offered in this essay function within the 
framework of a larger project, "Grace, Freedom, and the Fragility of 
Agency: A Theological Anthropology for a Fractured World," which will 
offer the contours of a theological anthropology of human finite freedom 
that simates the workings of grace in the social world of the cultures of 
late modernity as described in Charles Taylor's A Secular Age. l Taylor's 
account articulates crucial ways in which various modes of secularity re-
frame the conceptual and cultural coordinates for understanding the 
human in the aftermath of modernity. Inasmuch as these modes of secu-
larity locate the human within a self-sufficient "immanent frame," they 
offer little conceptual space from which to affirm that humanity and the 
cosmos stand in relation to the divine reality Christian faith names as the 
God who both transcends the world and is immanently present to it.2 
Taylor further argues that these fe-framed coordinates, by making it pos-
sible to attend closely to the shape and import of the dynamics of multi-
plicity in human culture, nonetheless provide new conceptual space for 
delimiting fundamental human moral and spiritual aspirations. In conse-
quence, even as a secular age sets loose forces fracturing once settled mean-
ings about humanity's relation to the divine, it also propels a "nova effect" 
opening new possibilities for discerning the Spirit working in the variety, 
breadth and depth of human and cosmic reality) 
As a result, a fundamental challenge for framing a theological anthro-
pology appropriate to "a secular age" is that its account of the human 
needs to fender intelligible the possibility of humanity standing in rela-
tion to a transcendent God, even as it is immersed within "secularities" 
that have both constituted an "immanent frame" for self-understanding 
[ Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Universiry Press, 2007). 
> Ibid.. Chapter 15, "The Immanent Frame," 539-593. 
l Ibid., Part III, "The Nova Effect," Chapters 8-II, 299-419. 
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and energized a "nova effect" for the human spirit. The forces operative 
in the secularities oflate modernity put efforts to understand the human 
into a matrix of what Taylor describes as "cross-pressures."4 On one side, 
there is pressure to reshape our understanding of what makes us human 
into contours provided by an immanent frame in which God is (pre-
sumed) absent but human spiritual impulses continue; on another side, 
there is pressure on believers to re-fashion their theological understand-
ing of how the divine gifting that enacts the immanent presence of the 
transcendent God toward humanity and all creation - an enactment that 
Christian theology names "grace" - functions with respect to a spiritually 
restive humanity now dwelling within an "immanent frame." 
"Contingency" has emerged as a central theme for this project, resonat-
ing in the conceptual spaces both of anthropology, now keyed to (but not 
only to) an "immanent frame" as the locus for the human condition, and 
of "grace," rendered as a locus of encounter of divine and human freedom. 
This theme, however, is differently "inflected" (i.e., functions with a dif-
ferent conceptual grammar) with respect to the terms - grace, freedom, 
and agency - the project title highlights as points of reference for theo-
logical anthropology. Articulating an anthropology of human fmite free-
dom appropriately attentive to grace working in human cultures shaped 
in the aftermath of modernity will thus require situating human agency 
and its exercise within the dynamics of the multiple inflections of contin-
gency. Such an anthropology should enable us to discern the lineaments 
of grace playing in the various fields of contingency stretched throughout 
the fracturing and fragmented cultures that humans now inhabit. 
Two "inflections" of contingency are of major consequence for con-
structing this anthropology of finite freedom. The first articulates the con-
tingency of creation, i.e., the original gratuity of God's bringing to be the 
entire creation of which the human is part; the second articulates the con-
tingency operating in creation, i.e., the dynamics of the created order that 
marks out the finitude of the scope and efficacy of the human agency 
exercised in that order. The first inflection renders the contingency of cre-
ation theologically as the sustained primal enactment of grace - good freely 
bestowed from and enacted by God's abundant inner goodness) The con-
tingency functioning within the primal enactment of grace that is creation, 
4 Taylor, Seotiar Age, Chapter 16, 594-617. 
5 See David Burrell, "Creation as Original Grace," God, Grace and Creation, ed. 
Philip J. Rossi (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2010) 99: "Avowing that the origin of the uni-
verse is free means, of course, that it is an utterly gratuitous act of God, a grace. n 
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however, is one that, in contrast, is inflected - particularly with respect to 
human agency - as a "contingency of uncertain outcome." This is the 
contingency of what might have been different, a contingency often mani-
fest as a contingency of fracrure, of events that could - and should - have 
been otherwise but were not, of "things gone wrong" in consequence of the 
enmeshment of human agency in the webs of multiple contingency in the 
workings of a created world standing totally in radical dependence. As a 
result, an adequate theological parsing of the differences between these two 
"inflections" of contingency must keep their uses in proper relation to one 
other. It requires that its account of (the grammars of) divine and human 
freedom serve a dual function that enables us, first, to recognize - with 
respect to each inflection - the radical difference between divine and human 
agency and, second, to articulate appropriate ways, notwithstanding that 
difference, for characterizing their relationship to each other. 
It is thus with reference to this project of articulating a theological 
anthropology of finite freedom, indexed to grace in terms of the double 
inflection of contingency, that I offer the three main points of this essay. 
These focus on human vulnerability as a central anthropological marker 
for discerning how the double inflection of contingency bears upon efforts 
to render the workings of grace theologically intelligible within the dynam-
ics of "a secular age." In particular, I argue for marking out human vulner-
ability as a "gracing," a divine gifting, enacted in a three-fold modality: 
first, as inscribed in the contingency of Creation; second, as taken into the 
triune relationality of God in the Incarnation; and, third, as transformed 
to salvific efficacy in the outpouring of the Spirit from the crucified and 
risen Lord Jesus. I will further propose that rendering human vulnerability 
as such a three-fold graced enactment then provides a central locus from 
which to discern normative claims emergent from the contested fields of 
interplay between "history" and "tradition." 
II. Normativity and the "Immanent Frame" 
Before setting forth the specifics of these points about the shape and 
function of human vulnerability within an anthropology of freedom and 
the bearing they have upon normative claims arising in history, it will be 
useful to provide a conceptual framework in which to situate "normativity" 
with respect to "history" and "tradition." While we can trace efforts to 
delineate the basis, function and scope of normative terms and judgments 
at least as far back as Socratic inquiry about the virtues, the trajectory of 
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recent Western treatments of normativity has followed the conceptual vec-
tors ingredient in what Taylor terms the "Great Disembedding" formative 
of modernity's "social imaginary" - i.e., "the ways in which [people] imag-
ine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go 
on between them and their fellows, the expectations which are normally 
met, and the deeper normative notions and images that underlie these 
expectations."6 Among these vectors are shifts that have taken place in 
understanding the self (from "porous" to "buffered"7), the fundamental 
structure of social relations (from a society of mediating "hierarchical com-
plementarity" to one of a horizontal "direct access," with a corresponding 
shift from "network" identities to "categorical" ones8), the workings of the 
natural world (from "enchanted" to "disenchanted"9), and time (from a 
dyadic interpenetration of "sacred" and "profane" times to an undifferen-
tiated monism of a purely linear, immanent temporality'°). 
These shifts have coalesced, on Taylor's account, into a "constella-
tion" of interlocking cosmic, social and moral orders of self-sufficient 
explanation, justification, and practice that make possible the social 
imaginary he calls "the immanent frame." Within the immanent frame, 
the long standing presumption in Western culture for belief in a (trans-
cendent) God as origin and fundament for the cosmic, social, and moral 
orders has become so contested that it no longer stands as the "default" 
position: Belief and unbelief are both contestable options, functions of 
individual choice no longer requiring a locus of social embedding for 
their intelligibility. Within such mutual contestability for both belief and 
unbelief, the "immanent frame" has a particularly consequential function 
for my placement of human vulnerability as a focus for discussion of the 
relation of normativity to history and tradition: The immanent frame 
now provides the dominant field of meaning in which modernity's high 
moral demands for universal benevolence and justice insistently pressure 
both belief and unbelief into a shared dilemma. This dilemma is whether 
either of them has sufficient moral capacity to empower fragile and vul-
6 Taylor, Secular Age, 171. See Chapter 3, "The Great Disembedding," 146-158, Chapter 
4, "Modern Social Imaginaries," 159-2lI, and Charles Taylor, Modem Social Imaginaries 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004) for detailed discussions of these concepts. 
7 Taylor, Secular Age, [34-I42, 3°0'3°7; see Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The 
Making of the Modem Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) Part II 
"Inwardness," III-207, for his account of the emergence of "the buffered self." 
8 Charles Taylor, Dilemmas and Connections (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 20U) 272. 
9 Taylor, Secular Age, 25-42. 
[0 Ibid, 54-59. 
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nerable human agents to respond adequately and consistently to the 
powerful aspirations to human fullness embedded in these demands, 
Taylor's account of "the immanent frame" has antecedents in his long-
standing project to counter reductive naturalism. II Since the publication 
of Sources of the Self, moreover, questions of moral. normativity framed in 
terms of "moral sources" and "constitutive goods," have served him as key 
points of reference for tracking the moral, religious, and spiritual condition 
of humanity as it has fitted itself (neither fully nor comfortably) into its 
current "immanent frame." Of particular note for my purposes is that his 
treatment of the normative coordinates he sees functioning in the cultures 
of secularity (as well as in its antecedents) explicitly attends to the workings 
of the multi-layered historical contexts from which these coordinates 
emerge, develop, and function. Furthermore, while not explicitly framing 
his project methodologically or substantively as theological, Taylor pays 
close attention to the theological horizons against which the "Great Dis-
embedding" took place. His account acknowledges - far more than most 
forms of what he terms the standard "subtraction" story of secularity and 
secularization - the complex role that the religious and theological dynam-
ics in the trajectory of "Christendom" (particularly the dynamics of 
"Reform") have had and continue to have in this process. 
In consequence, his work offers particularly useful conceptual, meth-
odological, and interpretive patterns from which to address the normativ-
icy at stake for theology in the interplay of history and tradition. These 
can be found throughout the various layers of his robust philosophical 
affirmation of a moral normativity discernible in the reflective and self-
interpreting workings of human agency as it engages history and culture. 
Taylor's account of the functioning of moral normativity in history is 
constructed with a view to providing an alternative narrative, with an 
appropriately differentiated conceptual framework, that disputes various 
contending views about the rise of the "modern sociat imaginary" and the 
"immanent frame" it brings in its wake. Some views - those espoused by 
the "boosters" of modernity, to which Taylor devotes considerable atten-
tion - often read modernity as a largely praiseworthy outcome of historical 
dynamics by which humanity has succeeded in placing itself intentionally 
and consciously on an upward epistemic and moral trajectory. 
Within this set of views, there is a strong strain of "exclusive humanism" 
that counts the sidelining of transcendence by the immanent frame as an 
" Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers I (Cambridge: 
Cambridge U niversiry Press, 1985) H2. 
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important human gain wrought in the course of modernity. Even as Taylor 
vigorously disputes these views on a number of counts, he does thereby not 
align himself with the counter views put forth by those he terms the "knock~ 
ers" of modernity - be it a backward looking hankering for a social world of 
hierarchical complimentarily, a Nierzschean transvaluation of the priority 
that modernity has given to justice and benevolence, or an anti~foundation~ 
alist skepticism about the possibility of any non~arbitrary construction of 
values. At the same time, he considers elements of yet another approach -
what he terms the "immanent revolt" deployed by forms of romanticism and 
expressivism in their stance against the forces of exclusive humanism - to 
indicate the persistence of a spiritual dynamic in human agency that the 
immanent frame has mostly made invisible." This dynamic, at work in both 
artistic and conceptual modes of the "immanent revolt," has played a role in 
drawing attention to human vulnerability and fragility as sites of "fissure" in 
the immanent frame. This suggests that, to the extent that an anthropology 
of human freedom recognizes the crucial role of vulnerability in marking out 
human freedom as finite, such vulnerability provides an appropriate vantage 
point for attending to grace at work amid and within these fissures. 
Embedded in Taylor's counter~account of "a secular age" is an affirma~ 
don central for discussion of the bearing of normativity upon history: His~ 
tory and culture provide the primary field for the enmeshment of human 
agency and freedom with the contingency of events in the world, as well as 
a vantage point offering a glimpse into the radical contingency of creation. 
That field encompasses, on the side of agency and freedom, the full array of 
self~determining human conduct and social practice, and, on the side of the 
contingency of events, the natural and social processes that function beyond 
the range of full human direction and control. Taylor's account also affirms 
a "moral realism" for the normative governance of human freedom and 
agency exercised within that field of interaction. He disputes views claiming 
that the contingency of events in the world and self~determining human 
conduct are the only elements in the formative dynamics of human moral 
valuation and action. Against these views, he argues that structurally ingredi~ 
ent in the constitution of that moral field is also a set of constitutive goods, 
which he describes as "something the love of which empowers us to do good 
and be good."l} These "strong moral sources" have a normative function that 
is both ethical and metaphysical.T4 These sources function as normative by 
" See Taylor, Sources, Chapters 23-24, 419-493; Secular Age, Chapter 16, "Cross Pres-
sures," 594-617. 
'J Taylor, Sources, 93. 
'4 Although Taylor does nO( explicitly address the ways in which moral and meta-
physical ordering intersect, I believe that he would agree with Susan Neiman's dictum that 
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giving direction to the self-determining activity of human freedom and 
agency. Taylor's moral realism is thus robustly teleological; its sources draw 
human conduct towards a "fullness" that, even as it encompasses human 
well-being in its totality, is not thereby determined exclusively or exhaus-
tively by that well-being, nor brought about solely by self-determining 
human conduct. The normativity of these sources is also metaphysical. Tay-
lor takes the fullness to which human activity is ordered to have its basis in 
that which can be appropriately affirmed not merely as an ideal moral hori-
wn arising from the self-determining structure of human freedom; it is a 
genuinely transcendent reality, providing the exercise of freedom in human 
moral agency with a fundamental vector towards a fullness that is not merely 
of its own making. 
III. Situated Freedom: 
Embodiment, Finitude, and Human Vulnerability 
Taylor's teleological moral realism of constitutive goods thus provides a 
major element in the conceptual framework within which to locate my 
claims about human vulnerability as a normative marker for the working 
of grace in history. A particular value of Taylor's account is that it makes 
possible the articulation of the "anthropologies of situated freedom" that 
he has long considered central for an adequate philosophical account of the 
human condition in the circumstances of late modernity and its aftermath. IS 
Taylor's overall project - the construction of a philosophical anthropology 
to counter the reductive naturalism entrenched in twentieth-century 
accounts of human agencyI6 - models a range of strategies needed for 
appropriately "situating" human freedom and the subjectivity it encom-
passes "by relating it to our life as embodied and social beings, without 
reducing [them] to a function of objectified nature."I? Notable among these 
"Ethics and metaphysics are not accidently connected. Whatever attempts we make to live 
rightly are attempts to live in the world.» See Susan Neiman, Evil in Modem Thought: An 
Alternative History of Philosophy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton U niversiry Press, 2002) 327. 
[I See Taylor, Sources, 514-515. Taylor does not offer a thematically focused treatment 
of "situated freedom" in Sources, but relies upon the discussion of this concept in Hegel 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975) 559-571; reproduced in Hegel and Mod-
ern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979) 154-169. 
[6 For his characterization of his project as "philosophical anthropology," see Human 
Agenry and Language, I, as well as the second in a series of 20n interviews on CBC radio 
[ http://www.cbc.ca/ideas/ ep isodes/201 1/0411 II the- malaise-of-moderni ty-part-1--51 ; 
accessed November 13, 20U]. 
[7 Taylor, Hegel and Modem Society, 167. 
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strategies are the forms of "thick description" he uses to capture the his-
torical, socio-cultural, and conceptual dynamics providing the context for 
concrete enactments of human freedom. As Taylor's thick descriptions 
unfold, he renders these enactments in terms that show them manifesting 
a capacity he considers crucial for articulating what it is to be human: self-
interpretation. IS Such thick descriptions, moreover, require dose attention 
to the material circumstances of the human condition in which self-inter-
preting human agents enact their freedom. At this level, framing an anthro-
pology of situated freedom requires recognition that one fundamental coor-
dinate of the human condition is that the self-interpreting hwnan agents 
who enact their freedom are embodied agents, whose agency functions in 
social relationships to other embodied agents within a nexus of interaction 
constituted by the material conditions of nature and culture. 
This recognition - i.e., that human freedom is enacted in society, cu~­
ture, and nature by self-interpreting embodied agents - is crucial. It links 
{he prior discussion of the function of constitutive goods as the locus for 
normativity within Taylor's account of human freedom situated in the 
historical context of a secular age to the claims that I make about human 
vulnerability as a normative marker for the operation and efficacy of grace 
in history. Taylor's situating of human freedom is primarily articulated in 
a mode that offers, as part of his efforts to refute naturalism, a philo-
sophical parsing of the language of human agency that can vindicate the 
validity and aptness of speaking of the structure and operation of subjectiv-
ity in that agency as enactments of an "enfleshed spirit." Transposed into 
the language of a long tradition of theological anthropology, Taylor's pro-
ject can be read as an effort to provide a contemporary philosophical 
grammar with which to parse an affirmation that body and soul, flesh and 
spirit, are mutually constitutive of human persons. 
His account of agency is thus, at least in part, an argument that we can 
truly construe our existence as human selves to be that of an embodied 
spiritual reality, i.e., that our human activities are animated at their inmost 
core by what properly may be termed "spirir."!9 Taylor's philosophical 
account of our human reality in its concrete situatedness is further marked 
,8 Self-interpretation requires hoth language and valuing: "[Tlo be a full human 
agent, to be a person or self in the ordinary meaning, is to exist in a space defined by 
distinctions of wa rth. A self is a being fa r wnom certain questions of categoric value have 
arisen, and received at least partial answers" (Human Agenry and Language, 3); see also 
"Self-interpreting animals," Human Agmry and Language, 45-76. 
'9 Taylor, Sources, 520: "The intention of this work was ... to bring air back again 
into the half-collapsed lungs of the spirit." 
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by an inclusive, soberly measured hopefulness for the future of human-
kind, a future also properly articulated in the grammar of "spirit." Nor-
mativity in history is thus indexed ro what enables the capacities and 
activities of the embodied agency of human spirit to attain its proper 
"fullness." This enabling condition for the capacity of human agents to 
attain fullness, as well as for that fullness itself, is the transcendent God 
upon which all that is stands in the radical contingency of creation. 
I will thus advance the claims made in the rest of this essay against 
the background of this reading of Taylor's project. These claims relate 
his philosophical parsing of the language of the freedom enacted by 
embodied htUllan agents as an affirmation of our human spiritual reality 
to a counterpart theological parsing of the language of "human vulner-
ability" that is made in terms of irs significance for the embodied social 
enactment of human freedom. This theological parsing of our human 
vulnerability will be delimited by indexing it to two central dimensions 
of our human situatedness, "contingency," and "finitude," as they stand 
against the background of a Trinitarian construal of the relational gifting 
that is "grace." Within this parsing, the hopefulness for the fullness that 
Taylor gestures toward in his grammar of spirit can be construed as the 
space within which possibilities open up for the created and human 
orders to be bearers of the grace of God and, insofar as they bear that 
grace, for their thereby being transformed by it. The addendum that 
I offer to Taylor's gesture toward fullness is that human vulnerability 
constitutes a central space upon which such possibilities open. 
Let me locate these claims in terms of an anthropology of human free-
dom that situates the workings of grace within the fracturing dynamics of 
the cultures of late modernity. The claim I am advancing here of most 
importance for that anthropology is that our embodiment is a fundamen-
tal marker of the vulnerability inscribed in our humanity in virtue of our 
being participant in both "inflections" of contingency: Vulnerability man-
ifests the fragility of a human finitude that is created as embodied. We are 
vulnerable in terms of the contingency that marks the radical dependence 
of creation upon the "original grace" of God's enacting and sustaining all 
creation into its being. This vulnerability is evoked in the recognition that 
we might not have been at all and, indeed, that crearion need not have 
been at all. It is the vulnerability of standing before an abyss of not-being, 
a vertiginous marker of the radical dependence inscribed in our being 
creatures. We are vulnerable as well in terms of the workings of the con-
tingency of uncertain outcome in creation, as that contingency bears upon 
the multi-leveled materiality of our embodied selves enmeshed in the 
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working of nature and culture; this vulnerability is most pronounced in 
the face of those ravages of contingency we rightly name suffering and evil. 
These are constituted in their unintelligibility precisely by the manner in 
which they resound with the dissonance between the two inflections of 
contingency. In consequence, even as the vulnerability marked by this 
latter inflection of contingency is often the one we experience as most 
pressing, adequately construing its anthropological and theological sig-
nificance nonetheless requires reading it in conjunction with the first 
inflection, the contingency of a creation that stands in radical dependence. 
N. Human Vulnerability and the Historical Normativity 
of God's Incarnation 
Taylor's project of situating the freedom of our self-interpreting embod-
ied social agency, particularly as that agency dwells amid "cross-pressures" 
from the "immanent frame," provides conceptual coordinates from which 
my account of human vulnerability, as it stands where the two inflections 
of contingency intersect, engages questions of the normativity of history. 
These coordinates structure a syntax by which the contours of this inter-
section - and the dissonance it brings forth - can be indexed historically 
and theologically to the trajectories impelled by the dynamics of socio-
cultural fragmentation in late modernity. This indexing involves tracking 
the freedom of our embodied social agency along both inflections of con-
tingency: Even as the "immanent frame" evokes new dissonant modula-
tions from the workings of the contingency of uncertain outcome, it also 
places the exercise of our self-interpreting agency into a context of a radi-
cal sundering from the contingency of creation. The coordinates drawn 
from Taylor's project provide a way to discern theological intelligibility in 
the modulations and the sundering at play in the immanent frame, each 
of which challenges the possibility of normative claims emerging out of 
the working of history. In particular, his account of the dilemmas that 
"cross-pressures" from persistent human moral and spiritual aspirations 
place upon "the immanent frame" suggests that Ollr enfleshed vulnerabil-
ity constitutes a central dimension of the human space in which the gifting 
of grace becomes normatively operative with respect to those aspirations. 
In the remainder of this essay I will thus briefly indicate how, within 
those dynamics of fragmentation, such "cross pressures" upon the imma-
nent frame provide a basis from which to orient theological efforts to con~ 
strue history normatively in a secular age. I will propose that the normativity 
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at work in the interplay of divine and human freedom constituting history 
is most properly referenced to the Incarnation, inasmuch as "the Word 
become flesh" stands to history as the graced fullness of divine and human 
freedom. I will do this by using Taylor's work as source for a preliminary 
"syntax of grace" to render theologically intelligible the dissonant intersec-
tion of the two inflections of contingency. This will make possible the 
articulation of a fundamental normative principle for the working of grace 
in the history that has eventuated in the fractured condition of a secular 
age. I will propose that this principle, which Taylor has formulated as 
"God's steadfast resolve not to abandon humanity in its worst distress,"2o 
exhibits its normativity through its full enactment in the incarnation and 
the suffering love of Jeslls, from which stem the salvinc outpouring of 
God's Spirit upon history, reaching its fi.tllness for our enfleshed, vulnerable 
agency in the eschatological promise of the resurrection of the body. 
The incarnation and the outpouring of the Spirit in a history ordered 
to eschatological fullness thus form the end point from which to read a 
normative theological intelligibility at work in the dynamics of disso-
nance and fracture, particularly as they have, in the aftermath of moder-
nity, thrown into relief the space "between" these two inflections of 
contingency as a central locus for our human vulnerability.2l Attention 
to this space of dissonance is, however, hardly a new concern arising 
uniquely within modernity encompassed within an "immanent frame." 
This dissonance defines the compelling tension in the Book of Job, 
which thus offers a useful starting point from an earlier horizon through 
which to read the theological intelligibility of those dynamics. This point 
is staked out within that book's narrative and argumentative contesta-
tions over the inflections of contingency as the space of interplay for the 
workings of human and divine agency. Underlying Job's defense thac the 
woes besetting him are unwarranted is an awareness that he - and indeed 
all humans - dwell in a dissonant space in which the inequitable work-
ings of contingency in creation can ultimately render morally pointless 
the contingency of radical dependence. The case he makes against the 
smugness of his friends' claims that blameless suffering is not part of the 
contingency in a world that comes from God is not simply a defense of 
'0 Taylor, Secular Age, 654. 
" Sources of the Self and A Secular Age anend to various manifestations of these 
«dynamics of fracture." Both Susan Neiman (Evil in Modern Thought) and George 
Steiner (Real Presences [Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 19891 and Grammars 
of Creation [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001]) provide astute commenraries 
on the forces at play in such fracturing. 
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his innocence within rhat world, as it would be if only the contingency 
of uncertain outcome wirhin creation were at issue. It is also a protest 
that puts rhe contingeney of creation itself at issue by rendering morally 
problematic, not simply rhe particular workings of the world's contin-
gency afflicting him, but the world's very being. 
The Book of Job stands as an enduring marker for how our embodied 
human vulnerability to the contingency of uncertain outcome continues 
to be manifest in poignant ways: in lives cut short in infancy and youth, 
in life projects gone amiss, in the ravages of pain and suffering inflicted by 
human neglect, violence, or enmity, and in disastrous consequences ensu-
ing from even the best of our intentions. Job sees far more clearly rhan his 
friends that contingencies in rhe world do not order themselves according 
to justice unfailingly rendered to humans who dwell in that world - Job 
is well aware that he is not the only righteous one subject to unwarranted 
suffering. This clarity of vision not only allows him to reject the stratagems 
his friends offer to render such injustice at least theologically, if not also 
morally, palatable; it emboldens Job to call the Creator to account for 
bringing into being an order of contingency that is morally opaque or, 
even worse, has no reliable moral structure at all. In this challenge to God, 
Job is probing, more deeply than his friends have the wisdom or the cour-
age to do, the space upon which the contingency of the radical dependence 
of creation - from which issues the unasked-for character of Job's own 
existence as well as the sheer abundance of a cosmos teeming with energy 
and life - intersects most painfully with the contingency of fracture and 
uncertain outcome, with things gone wrong within creation. 
The dissonance between these two inflections of contingeney resound-
ing throughout the book has made it a multivalent point of reference for 
the modern enterprise of "rheodiey," which often weaves together vari-
ous strands of the argument - though perhaps not the most theologically 
important ones - between Job and his friends. Yet Job himself, as Kant 
(among others) has pointed out, can hardly be considered to have either 
offered or accepted a "theodiey."'2 Neither can it be satisfactorily argued 
(at least in my judgment) that the concluding narrative restoring Job's 
prosperity is sufficient to silence the dissonance. A reader attuned to 
Job's acute sensitivity to the fragility of a human life led righteously in 
a contingent wodd, may very wen wonder whether the echoes of aU that 
12 See Kam's 1791 essay «On the Miscarriage of All Philosophical Trials in Theodicy," 
trans. George di Giovanni, in Immanuel Kant, Religion and R4tional Theology (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 24-37-
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has befallen him can - or should - ever fully fade from his or our mem-
ory. Job's new progeny open new space in his world for human satisfac-
tion, yet they cannot re-fill the space made abruptly empty by the calam-
ity that befell his other children. That past is stubbornly recalcitrant to 
full erasure, so the renewal of Job's prosperity and well-being does not 
suffice to exhibit the cosmos as working in ways that are normatively 
fully intelligible ro the deepest aspirations of our enfleshed vulnerability. 
What I thus propose in place of a reading framing these dissonances in 
terms of a theodicy of a moral order inexorably inscribed in the cosmos is 
one framing them in terms of "grace," understood as a gifted enactment 
of God's relationality that becomes operative in the intersecting space of 
both inflections of contingency. On this reading, the crucial narrative 
moment is not the restoration of Job's health and prosperity vindicating 
his righteousness and the normative intelligibility of the cosmos, but God's 
replying to Job as a performative enactment of grace. This is a divine 
initiative whose graciousness consists in standing with Job in the space 
upon which the dynamics of contingency have disastrously ravaged him. 
God thus enacts the vindication of Job's honest boldness in calling the 
Creator to account by being present to and standing with Job even as Job 
remains amid the ruins of his world. In this regard Taylor's remark about 
the "the first mystery" is particularly apt as an emblem of the grace at work 
in this narrative crux, a grace that finds its culmination in the "being with 
us" that is the Incarnation of God's word: "God's initiative is to enter, in 
full vulnerability, the heart of the [human] resistance [to God], to be 
among humans, offering participation in the divine life."'J 
There is no single theological line bringing us directly from reading the 
Book of Job as a not altogether unambiguous narrative enactment of 
"God's steadfast resolve not to abandon humanity in its worst distress" to 
the Christian confession that the Word of God became incarnate. Though 
it may be quite proper to consider God's response to being called to 
account for creation by Job as instancing some element of that steadfast 
resolve, the moment of grace in which God stands with Job still seems 
distant from what is enacted in the Incarnation: God's entrance "in [the] 
full vulnerability" of human flesh to "the heart of the human resistance," 
with its offer of "participation in divine life." At the same time, however, 
we may well remember the strand of Christian theological reflection and 
piety that has seen fit to take Job's confidence that a vindicator will stand 
by him Uob 19:25-27) as an anticipatory affirmation of that graced mode 
l) Taylor, Secular Age, 654. 
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of enfleshed participation in divine life that is the fruit for us of the Incar-
nate Word's passage through death to life: the resurrection of the body.24 
In a moment in which Job's enfleshed human vulnerability has been 
stretched to the utmost, first by the events that have befallen him, and 
then by the well-intentioned but ineffectual and theologically arrogant 
consolations offered by his friends, God finally does stand by and with 
Job. This can be taken (at least by a Christian reader) as a partial gesture 
toward a more complete mode of divine enactment of the resolve not to 
abandon humanity in its worst distress, a mode beyond the horizon of 
human hope and imagination until it came to pass in the graced fullness 
of the mutual historical enactment of divine and human freedom that 
Christians name the Incarnation. By the Incarnation of God's Word in 
the person of Jesus Christ, the human enfleshed vulnerability into which 
we have been inscribed within the radical contingency of creation is 
invited and taken into the triune relationality of God. Yet even as it is 
taken into that relationality, it does not lose its own proper depth as the 
enfleshed vulnerability of human agency that stands in the radical 
dependence of creation. This has been recognized in the wisdom by 
which centuries of piety and iconography have inscribed onto Christian 
imagination the narrative affirmation of the gospels that the wounds of 
the Passion remain enfleshed in the risen One. 
This enfleshment of the Word may be enough by itself to give norma-
tive status to human vulnerability, but it seems also appropriate to claim 
that there is yet even more depth to its grounding, arising as an excess 
from the abundance of the divine graciousness. The incarnational divine 
entrance into the full range of created contingency and human vulner-
ability is made even deeper in the confession that this enfleshed Word 
is the Jesus who has been crucified, now is risen, and whose saving Spirit 
has been poured out upon all creation. In making the enfleshed vulner-
ability of the now-risen crucified one the locus of the salvific efficacy of 
the spirit - captured in the proclamation that "by his wounds we are 
healed" (Isa 53 :5) - human vulnerability is constituted "all the way 
down" as a normative marker for the operation and efficacy of grace in 
history. In confessing the full enactment of God's graciousness towards 
us in the incarnate, crucified, and risen Word of God, we are also affirm-
ing the grace of God as always and everywhere offered and encountered 
throughout all the spaces of enfleshed human vulnerability. 
'4 This connection is notably made in the use of Job 19:2~-27 for Christian funeral 
and burial services. 
